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NOTES
Corporate Gatekeepers: An Examination of the
Transactional Lawyer's Role
William H. Dorton'
It is both our burden and our glory that we are expected to live by a
high professional standard and earn a living at the same time. We do not
have the luxury of the clergy who can live in the temple and condemn the
market place. Nor do we have the more flexible standard of those who live
solely in the market place. We have to carry the standards of the temple into
the market place and practice our trade there. That is why a country which
questions its moral behavior inevitably questions its lawyers.
Dean Redlich2
INTRODUCTION
S EVERAL highly public corporate scandals at the beginning of the 
last
decade exposed a systemic problem in the priorities of a considerable
number of corporate lawyers.' Those lawyers took advantage of their
positions of public trust and confidence and failed to restrain corporate
insiders who were perpetrating frauds on unsuspecting shareholders.'
These scandals shocked the market community, which is premised on
open and honest communications in transactions. Enron is the paradigmatic
example. Enron's lawyers facilitated transactions that drastically misstated
Enron's financial situation over the course of several years.s The serious
nature of such a scandal is not to be taken lightly; the revelation of the fraud
put Enron and its accounting firm out of business, eliminating thousands
I University of Kentucky College of Law, JD expected 2011. The author would like to
offer sincere thanks to Professor Rutheford B Campbell for his assistance in exploring the
original topic and offering needed criticism and advice.
2 Norman Redlich, Lawyers, the Temple, and the Market Place, 30 Bus. LAW. (SPECIAL ISSUE)
65, 65 (1974).
3 See Ellen Joan Pollock, Limited Partners: Lawyers for Enron Faulted its Deals, Didn't
Force Issue, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2002, at Ai (detailing the role of a law firm in the Enron
scandal); see also William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 1275, 1275 (2002) (exploring "the implications that the Enron collapse holds out for the
self-regulatory system of corporate governance").
4 See Martin C. McWilliams, Jr., Guardians Adrift: The SocialAnthropology of the Corporate
Gatekeeper Professions, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 225, 262-63 (2007).
5 Pollock, supra note 3.
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of jobs and shaking investor confidence in the securities market.' Enron's
lawyers' culpable behavior has been characterized as acting as accessories to
the fraudulent transactions by failing to "blow the whistle," and "back[ing]
down when rebuffed" by Enron's officers.' In the wake of Enron and related
scandals, the corporate transactional lawyer has been placed squarely in the
crosshairs of legislative and regulatory reform.
A. Informational Asymmetry and Required Disclosures
Enron and other like scandals were met with widespread public
condemnation and swift legislative response largely because they shook
the U.S. economic system at its roots.8 Since Adam Smith's seminal
insights in The Wealth of Nations, most western market economies have
been premised on a capital-formation process structured on individual
self-interest.' A fundamental precept of the market economy is that each
of countless actors pursues his individual interests with access to only a
tiny sliver of the information generated by the market as a whole.io In
doing so, the individual market actor passively invests his or her money for
management by corporate insiders." While unsophisticated investors are
more or less on equal footing with one another, sophisticated investors and
corporate insiders have much greater access to investment information.1 2
This "informational asymmetry" tilts the playing field toward the corporate
insider and creates an enormous potential for abuse." This poses a very
real threat to capital formation: when the passive investor becomes
uncomfortable investing in the market because of the fear of manipulation
by corporate insiders, the entire system may falter for lack of funds.
The grave threat to capital formation posed by the asymmetrical flow
of information requires steadfast maintenance through an efficient system
of regulation. The primary means used to address this broad informational
disparity between individual investors and corporate insiders has long been
the type of required disclosures promulgated in the wake of the 1929 stock
6 Gary Fields, Plan Would Soften White-Collar Fines, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2010, at A3.
7 Pollock, supra note 3.
8 See infra Part IV for further discussion of the legislative response.
9 See Joseph Cropsey, Adam Smith, in HIsToRY OF PoLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 635, 649 (Leo
Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987). Cropsey describes Smith as "an architect of our
present system of society" for "his famous elaboration of the principles of free enterprise or
liberal capitalism." Id. at 635.
Io See id. at 649-50.
ii Michelle M. Harner, Corporate Control and the Needfor Meaningful BoardAccountability,
94 MINN. L. REv. 541, 551-52 (2010).
12 See Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers andDrawbacks oftheDisclosureAnidote: Towarda
More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 15i-54 (2oo6).
13 Cf id. at 152-53 (explaining that less "informational asymmetry" results in a market
where investors can make more informed decisions about the value of an investment).
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market crash.14 The Securities Act of 1933's and the Securities Exchange
Act of 193416 enacted a system of comprehensive disclosure, including
establishment of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as an
enforcement mechanism. 7 The rationale supporting required disclosures
in the corporate context is three-fold: incentivize corporate managers to act
in their shareholders' best interests, reduce informational asymmetry in the
markets to facilitate efficient transactions, and maintain investor confidence
in securities markets."a The meaningful idea is that honest communication
is fundamental to the integrity of the system as a whole.' 9 While the SEC
is generally effective in enforcing disclosure requirements, using the threat
of legal action as its primary deterrent, high-profile corporate scandals
involving fraudulent disclosures, like Enron, continue to occur.2 0
B. Advent of the Gatekeeper
In an effort to fulfill its mission to ensure adequate flow of information
to investors, the SEC regularly adjusts its regulatory focus to rein in
conduct by corporate actors that undermines the foundation of the
system. Transactional lawyers who operate in the corporate sphere are
natural objects of the SEC's interest due to the integral role they play in
corporate activity.' Transactional lawyers' activities range from assisting in
14 Id. at 149-51.
15 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §H 77a-77aa (2oo6).
16 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. H§ 78a-78nn (zoo6).
17 See Ripken, supra note 12, at 149-150; see also How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtmi
(last modified Sept. 20, 2010).
18 Ripken, supra note 12, at 151-54.
19 See Jill E. Fisch, The Overstated Promise of Corporate Governance, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 923,
956 (2010) (reviewing JONATHAN MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT; PROMISES
BROKEN (2oo8) (noting that "accurate share prices depend on honest disclosure"); James A.
Fanto, Recognizing the "Bad Barrel" in Pnblic Business Finms: Social and Organizational Factors in
Misconduct by Senior Decision-Makers, 57 Bur. L. REV. 1,36(2oo9) ( "[Tihe law's focus is on ac-
curate disclosure of material information...."); Hillary A. Sale, Banks: TheForgotten(?) Partners
in Fraud, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 139, 139 (2004) (characterizing disclosure as "the chief method for
cleansing fraud"); see also EA. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 29 (1960). The author
notes the importance of being able to act in society pursuant to one's own unique knowledge
and points out the "inevitable ignorance of all of us concerning a great many of the factors on
which the achievement of our ends and welfare depends." Id. (citation omitted).
2o See, e.g., Vauhini Vara, McAfee Ex-Finance Chief Is Convicted in Fraud Case, WALL ST. J.,
May II, 2007, at C2; Paul Davies & Carrick Mollenkamp, New Indictment Details Refco Cus-
tomer Losses, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2oo6, at C4; Kara Scannell et al., SEC Suits Could Influence
Delphi Ownership Talks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2oo6, at A3; Steven Pearlstein, UnitedHealth's
Options Scandal Shows Familiar Symptoms, WASH. PosT, Oct. 18, 2oo6, at DI; Dean Starkman,
Ahold Settles Lawsuit for $1.1 Billion; Giant Foods Parent Resolves Securities Fraud Class Action,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 29, 2005, at D3.
21 See, e.g., Stephen M. Cutler, Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC, Address to
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the structuring, negotiation, and documentation of business transactions
to advising corporate directors in complying with fiduciary duties owed to
shareholders.?2 Their utility as catalysts to SEC enforcement goals has long
been recognized. 3 As early as 1973, commentators observed that corporate
lawyers are essential to a corporation's entry into transactions in securities
markets.24 The corporate-lawyer-as-gatekeeper notion was widely adopted
by courts, academics, and regulators before Enron and related corporate
scandals cast such a probing light on their role."
The fraud and mismanagement that occurred to such devastating effect
at Enron, and elsewhere, refocused scrutiny on the corporate transactional
lawyer's role as gatekeeper. 6 To the consternation of legislators, regulators,
and academics, a problem they had considered and addressed recurred
unexpectedly in a spectacular and public fashion. As one observer noted,
"[t]he frauds occurred despite several levels of monitoring by, among others,
directors, prominent accounting and law firms, institutional shareholders,
the UCLA School of Law: The Themes of Sarbanes-Oxley as Reflected in the Commis-
sion's Enforcement Program (Sept. 20, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spcho92oo4smc.htm ("Consistent with Sarbanes-Oxley's focus on the important role of law-
yers as gatekeepers, we have stepped up our scrutiny of the role of lawyers in the corporate
frauds we investigate.").
22 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid", 57 Bus.
LAw. 1403, 1405 (2002).
23 See Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Liability for Client Fraud, 1991 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. I
for a pre-Enron review of cases and literature.
24 Morgan Shipman, The Need for SEC Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil Liabilities of At-
torneys Under the Federal Securities Statutes, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 231, 237 (1973).
25 See Felts v. Nat'l Account Sys. Ass'n, Inc., 469 E Supp. 54, 68 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (ob-
serving that, because the corporate lawyer could reasonably foresee that investors would rely
on his skill, he "voluntarily assumed a relationship ... with the purchasers of these securi-
ties"); see also Steinberg, supra note 23, at 1-2.
26 For a variety of perspectives on the transactional lawyer's role in the "post-Enron"
world, see Rutheford B Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical Obligation of Transac-
tionalLarwyers to Act as Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9, 14 (2003) (arguing that the MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT provide insufficient guidance to transactional lawyers);
Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L.
REV. 725, 733 (2004) (setting out the circumstances surrounding the SEC's new rules, examin-
ing the application of the rules, and identifying certain ambiguities in the rules); Jerry A. Is-
enberg & William E. Donnelly, Lawyers as Gatekeepers: An SEC Enforcement Perspective, 39 REV.
SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 97,97 (2oo6) (describing the SEC rules, the case law in which these
rules were applied, and expressing certain cautions inherent in the rules); Larry E. Ribstein,
Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Ox/ey Act of 2oo2,
28 J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2002) (arguing that "more regulation is not the answer" because the recent
"frauds occurred after seventy years of securities regulation"); Fred C. Zacharias, Coercing
Clients: Can Lawyer Gatekeeper Rules Work?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 455, 455 (2006) (focusing on the
incentives lawyers have to implement coercive rules relating to regulatory changes and the
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT).
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debt rating agencies, and securities analysts."" A recalibration of the
regulatory framework was inevitable.
C. Recalibration of the Gatekeeper Role
The response to the regulatory system's abject failure to deter massive
fraud was swift and took place along three fronts: Congress addressed
the failure through legislation, the SEC acted via rulemaking, and the
American Bar Association (ABA) amended their rules of professional
ethics." Congress acted first, passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002
("Sarbanes-Oxley"), 9 which, among its sweeping reforms, directed
the SEC to promulgate rules to govern corporate lawyers' responses to
managerial misconduct.30 Congress, in Sarbanes-Oxley, mandated that the
new rules require any lawyer who represents an SEC issuing company and
who "practic[es] before the Commission" to "report evidence of a material
violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation
by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the
chief executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof)."' If
such reporting does not elicit an "appropriate[] respon[se]" to the alleged
wrongdoing, the lawyer is required "to report the evidence to the audit
committee.. . or to another committee of the board of directors comprised
solely of [independent] directors . . . or to the board of directors."" The
SEC, in response to a "tight congressional deadline,"3 issued a new rule
addressing those directives.-
The ABA called its own task force to address managerial misconduct in
the corporate governance arena.3 The task force's report addressed corporate
governance in general, and in particular, Model Rule 1.6, regarding attorney-
client confidentiality, and Model Rule 1.13, regarding representation of
organizations. 6 The task force considered requiring disclosures to relevant
regulatory authorities in cases of managerial misconduct, but it ultimately
recommended a permissive disclosure standard.
27 Ribstein, supra note 26, at 3 (emphasis added).
28 Campbell & Gaetke,supra note 26, at 10-12.
29 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, i 16 Stat. 745.
30 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006).
31 Id.
32 Id. § 7245(2).
33 Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 26, at I I.
34 Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7 (2oso).
35 Cramton et al., supra note 26, at 729.
36 Id. at 729-30; see also Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 26, at 12-13.
37 See ABA, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssoCIATION TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE RE-
SPONSIBILITY, reprinted in 59 Bus. LAW. I45, 172-73 (2003); see also Cramton et al., supra note
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D. Summary of Contents
This Note will examine the debate regarding the appropriate
regulatory framework to ensure corporate compliance with SEC disclosure
requirements, the early precedential proceedings interpreting the SEC's new
approach, and what those interpretations mean for the practicing corporate
lawyer. Part I proceeds with a general primer on corporate "culture,"
wherein I describe the manner in which the culture of large corporate law
firms drifted toward a client-driven agenda that fundamentally altered the
corporate lawyer's notion as to his goals and appropriately achieving them.
Part II describes the approach of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to
the gatekeeper role of the transactional lawyer. I ultimately conclude that
the Model Rules as amended remain woefully inadequate to provide the
proper incentives for satisfactory conduct by transactional lawyers. Part III
introduces Sarbanes-Oxley" and the regulatory framework promulgated
under its mandate. In this section, I examine the mechanics of the
regulatory approach as well as several enforcement actions brought by the
SEC pursuant to its authority. I conclude that the SEC approach under
Sarbanes-Oxley is superior, but flawed. One flaw is that the culpability
threshold is too low, implicating corporate gatekeepers whose behavior
does not warrant the accompanying sanctions. I suggest that the SEC
would be a superior monitor of the securities markets if it implemented a
more transparent process whereby specific types of gatekeeper conduct are
identified and associated with corresponding sanctions. Finally, I argue for
a two-tiered system in which different proceedings accompany different
levels of culpability.
I. PRELUDE: CORPORATE GATEKEEPERS AND CULTURAL DRIFT
A. Markets as Social Groups
Social anthropology inevitably bears on any analysis of a discrete group
of people who comport themselves according to a common set of behavioral
norms and beliefs.39 The corporate boardroom with its constituent players-
directors, managers, and counsel, to name a few-provides an example of
a distinct "culture" that may be fruitfully analyzed using anthropological
concepts.' This analysis applies equally well to the culture that attends
large law firms that service corporate clients." Over the last three decades,
a new set of behavioral norms and cultural notions has emerged regarding
26, at 73o n.17.
38 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, I16 Stat. 745.
39 See McWilliams, supra note 4, at 226-27.
40 See id.
41 See id.
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the proper beneficiaries of the corporate gatekeeper's duty to ensure
the efficient operation of the financial markets.42 Large corporations and
the large law firms that counsel them effectively "instrumentalized" the
positive laws of corporations and put them to work for their financial
advantage through manipulation of financial disclosures. 43 This process
developed, in large part, because counsel to large corporations capitalized
on their public reputations for honesty and fair-mindedness to assist in
structuring and documenting financial transactions." The culture of the
large law firm drifted from one of accountability and duty to one of self-
interested profit maximization.45
The corporation is usefully conceived of as a "'little planned society,'"4
an institution underpinned by cultural norms and rules. Those cultural
norms include:
a perceived and shared understanding of a basis for trust; confidence in
the function of agency; confidence in the function of contract; socially
acceptable desire for the increase of private wealth from a passive source;
public institutions to serve private interests; the concept of money;
confidence in various means of information communication, retention and
exchange; confidence in certain reliable expectations on which accurate
prediction can be based; and on and on. 47
More broadly, individuals who participate in the American financial
markets are a cohesive social group whose "common goals, understandings,
symbols and communication are both informed by and describe a culture." 48
A hallmark of this market-based cultural group is investor confidence. If an
investor does not feel comfortable putting his or her money into the hands
of corporate managers, the market does not function efficiently. 49 Because
of its emphasis on passive investment, the integrity of the entire cultural
system requires a critical threshold of investor trust in the quality
42 See id. at 273-74 ("Over a period of some 30 years the financial markets' guardian
professions altered the informing notion of their culture from public service to profit maxi-
mization.").
43 Id. at 268. McWilliams describes "instrumentalization" as the process of law firms us-
ing the "cultural values" attached to the legal profession to their advantage. Those firms were,
in turn, instrumentalized by corporate managers as part of a "power exercise in which one
social group employs leverage to obtain the agency of another. Id.
44 Id. at 26I-62.
45 See id. at 228.
46 Id. at 246 (quoting RONALD H. COASE, ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND EcoNousTs 8
(1994)).
47 Id. at 245.
48 Id. at 244.
49 See id. at 256 ( "[Tihe market rests upon a cultural notion of investor protection in ef-
ficient markets based on good faith and information symmetry.").
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of information provided by those who seek to attract investments.s0 This
is, for practical purposes, why the SEC exists: to force relevant disclosures
so that ill-informed investors are able to make rational decisions with their
money.
B. The "New Breed" of Corporate Executives
In the face of "[t]he huge mass of information, and the huge numbers of
members of the market community who generate, manipulate, and employ
it," mere SEC disclosure requirements are insufficient to ensure the systemic
integrity of the market.s" Further muddying the waters of the market
culture, scholars have noted the rise of "a new breed of corporate executives
who are unconstrained by the traditional devices."" The characteristics of
the "new breed" of corporate manager include high tolerance for intense
competition, exaggerated sense of ego and self-interest that buffets moral
anxiety, a large appetite for risk-taking, and intense firm loyalty." While the
prevalence and presence of corporate executives with such a personality-
type has facilitated share price appreciation for particular companies, it
has also facilitated the use of questionable accounting methods and legal
advice to disastrous effect, namely, enhanced executive compensation and
excessive risk-taking with the money of passive investors.'
C. The Needfor a Gatekeeper
The new breed of corporate executives, with their penchant for
excessive risk-taking and disruption of the flow of accurate information to
the market, needed more than mere positive regulation from Congress and
the SEC to keep them from destroying the delicate balance of the market."
The failure of positive rules to regulate the flow of information to financial
markets-due to their rigidity-requires that cultural norms fill the void. 6
Enter the corporate transactional lawyer: a "cultural shepherd" whose role
is to steer the company toward compliance with positive regulations, even
for matters only implicitly governed by those regulations. 7 Corporate
gatekeepers have been described as "reputational intermediaries who
provide verification and certification services to investors."5 8 Put another
5o See id. at 248.
51 Id. at 257.
52 Ribstein, supra note 26, at 9 (citation omitted).
53 See McWilliams, supra note 4, at 249-51.
54 See id. at 248-5o.
55 Id. at 256.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 257 (quoting Coffee, supra note 22, at 1405 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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way, the cultural role of the corporate gatekeeper is to serve as a "proxy
for the eyes and ears that most investors lack, and [as] a check on issuers'
opportunistic behavior." 9 The corporate lawyer obtained this cultural role
via public trust in the "civic trusteeship" nature of her profession.'
D. Failure of the Gatekeeper
As the foregoing implies, Enron and like scandals demonstrated a
spectacular failure of the gatekeeper professionals involved. The failure
of Enron's gatekeepers demonstrates the "culture drift" that has taken
place in the corporate legal profession.6' It amounts to a recalibration of the
corporate law firm's culture from one based on service to one based on self-
regard and profit.62 This "re-branding" was accompanied by a change in the
way law firm culture operated. Senior members became valued for their
relationships with corporate insiders; relationships that were leveraged to
obtain work for younger partners and associates and increase the firm's
bottom line.6 In addition to the focus on "rainmaking partners," firms began
to shop among each other for clients willing to pay the highest rates.' The
dominance of the senior member who aligned with corporate insiders led
inexorably to cultural drift inside the firm and toward alignment with the
aggressive and reckless culture of the "new breed" corporate manager.s
As a result, the corporate lawyer tended to "adopt the client's
subjective culture, including the associated 'pathologies . . . including
excessive optimism and loyalty, and reduce their concern for their .. .firm's
reputation."' The result was, in socio-anthropological terms, an example
of "a power exercise in which one social group employs leverage to obtain
the agency of another."16 This "social reordering" resulted in the corporate
legal profession instrumentalizing its "cultural values," that is, its reputation
for trustworthiness. 68 In short, effective gate-keeping by corporate lawyers
was jettisoned in the pursuit of profit, a process facilitated by corporate law
firms becoming subservient to increasingly aggressive clients.
59 Id. at 258.
6o Id. at 259 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
61 Id. at 262.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 264.
64 Id. at 265 (citation omitted).
65 Id. at 266.
66 Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Ribstein, supra note 26, at 9).
67 Id. at 268.
68 See id.
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II. 'lME MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT'S
PERMISSIVE CULPABILITY PREDICATE
The Introduction and Part I serve as a prelude, but the real story of the
situation the modern corporate transactional lawyer finds herself in begins
with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"). It is telling
that the Model Rules were promulgated long before Enron and related
scandals shook Congress and the SEC to action, yet they remain essentially
unchanged. The corporate gatekeeper's role as "proxy for the eyes and ears
that most investors lack"69 was well known to the Model Rules' drafters. As
early as 1973, the Second Circuit observed that "[e]ffective implementation
of [investor] safeguards . . . depends in large measure on the members of
the bar who serve in an advisory capacity to those engaged in securities
transactions." 70
There is, however, a wide gulf between simply recognizing that an issue
exists and setting forth an adequate regulatory framework within which to
address the issue. The critical flaw in the approach taken by the drafters
of the Model Rules is its culpability predicate: a lawyer must have actual
knowledgeof a violation in order to be placed under any obligation to report.71
The drafters' culpability requirement, though problematic, was not novel.
Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, many courts held that corporate attorneys owed no
independent duty of disclosure "absent proof of the elements of principal
or aiding and abetting liability."7
Without positive law adopted by Congress to govern less-than-criminal
behavior, the corporate lawyer's professional conduct was governed
exclusively by the Model Rules." The essential thrust of the Model Rules
as they concern the lawyer's gatekeeper role is contained in Model Rules
1.13 and 1.2(d).74 "Under Model Rule 1.13(a), an organization's lawyer is to
consider her 'client' to be the organization itself."7 This "'entity theory"'
provides a "crucial frame of reference" for the corporate lawyer, dictating
that she does not represent any of the various corporate stakeholders
individually, but the corporate entity as a whole. 6 The entity theory is
69 Id. at 258.
70 SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 536 (ad Cir. 1973).
71 Campbell & Gaetke,supra note 26, at 51-52 (emphasis added).
72 Steinberg, supra note 23, at 2 (citation omitted).
73 These rules are still highly relevant to the corporate lawyer's course of conduct, and
will be compared with the SEC's approach in Part III.
74 Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 26, at 15-16.
75 Id. at 16 (citations omitted).
76 Id. at 16-17 (citation omitted); see also Arifin v. Matuszewich, No. 98 C 1591, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8624, at *14-15 (N.D. Ill. June 2o, 2ooo). Butsee Berliner Corcoran & Rowe,
L.L.P. v. Orian, 563 F. Supp. 2d 250, 256 (D.D.C. 20o8) (holding that Rule 1.13 does not pre-
sume a conflict of interest when an attorney represents both an organization and an individual
employed by the organization).
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useful in the abstract: counsel to the corporation simply looks to the best
interests of the corporation as a whole. As a practical matter, however, the
entity theory has its shortcomings. Observers have noted that the Model
Rules' "blithe reference to the client's identity under the entity theory"
collapses when the actions or decisions of corporate managers would injure
other corporate stakeholders or constitute violations of the securities laws."
An example of such a situation is found in the structural conflicts inherent
in the makeup of the corporate entity." Tensions between the interests of
various corporate stakeholders inevitably arise in the conduct of corporate
affairs. For example, corporate lawyers are natural allies of the managers
who enlist their services and bear but an abstract relationship, in most
cases, with the shareholders.79 These situations can become challenging
from an ethical perspective, and Model Rule 1.13(b) provides guidance.
There are two essential components to the operation of Rule 1.13(b): the
culpability predicate and instructions for how the lawyer should respond
if that predicate is met. In situations where the lawyer "knows" that a
corporate constituent "is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act
in a matter related to the representation"so and the constituent's action is
"a violation of a legal obligation to the organization,"" or is a "violation
of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization and that is
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization,"8 the lawyer's
responsibility to act is triggered. Pursuant to the foregoing analysis, the
culpability predicate under the Model Rules approach is best stated as an
actual knowledge requirement.
The actual knowledge standard promulgated under Model Rule 1.13(b)
has been harshly criticized in the post-Enron academic literature. One
hypothetical scenario demonstrating the problem posits that the president
of a corporation requests that the lawyer "lend assistance to an unwarranted
corporate gift to a friend of the president."" Under the permissive Rule
1.13(b) standard, the lawyer could lend assistance, assuming the gift was not
a violation of the president's fiduciary duties, and not violate the rule.' This
is true whether the lawyer's failure to inquire into the nature of the gift was
negligent or even reckless.85 The conclusion is inescapable: "[s]uch a lax
standard is impossible to reconcile with any claim that the legal profession
requires sensible, fair, and demanding conduct from its members or that
77 Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 26, at 21 (citation omitted).
78 Id. at 30.
79 See id.
8o MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. I.13(b) (2009).
8 I Id.
82 Id.
83 Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 26, at 53.
84 Id.
85 See id. at 53-54.
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members of the profession function as gatekeepers."6 Some observers
have concluded that the "triggering standard" under the Model Rules is
"so weak that lawyers inclined to do so can easily circumvent it.""
Once the corporate lawyer has actual knowledge of misconduct, the
action required of her is left to her discretion under Model Rule 1.13(b)."
Specifically, the rule requires her to "proceed as is reasonably necessary in the
best interest of the organization."" It is relevant to note that the rules were
amended by the ABA in 2003-post-Enron-and yet the amended version
retains the discretionary regime as to how the lawyer should proceed.90
The amended rules require that the lawyer "refer the matter to higher
authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances
to the highest authority that can act of behalf of the organization," but this
requirement does not apply if "the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not
necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so."" Further, if the
lawyer acts under Rule 1.13(b) but is rebuffed, the amended version of
Rule 1.13(c) requires disclosure outside the corporation only if the action
is "clearly a violation of law . . . reasonably certain to result in substantial
injury to the organization."92 The "tepid approach" to mandatory "whistle-
blowing" has been debated and retained since its formal adoption by the
ABA in 1983.'
The final component of the lawyer's ethical response to client
wrongdoing is found in Model Rule 1.2(d). This rule prohibits any lawyer
from advising or assisting a client "in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent."" In the corporate context, Rule 1.2(d) can be
viewed as a manifestation of the "public service" type of profession
86 Id. at 55. Furthermore, the actual knowledge standard under Rule 1.13(b) is perhaps
even inconsistent with the broad duty under Rule i.i to provide competent representation.
Id. & n.164. Campell and Gaetke highlight the potential inconsistency:
Model Rule i.i states: "A lawyer shall provide competent represen-
tation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowl-
edge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for rep-
resentation." One might speculate that most cautious lawyers seeking
to provide competent representation to their corporate clients would
employ a more demanding standard than "aetual knowledge" when
confronting potentially inappropriate managerial conduct.
Id. at 55 n.164 (internal citation omitted).
87 Cramton et al., supra note 26, at 763.
88 Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 26, at 22.
89 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. I.13(b) (2009).
90 See Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 26, at 22.
91 MODEL RULES OF PRoF'L CONDUcT R. I.13(b) (2oo9).
92 Id. R. 1.13(c).
93 Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 26, at 24 (citations omitted).
94 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. I.2(d) (20o9).
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described by Professor McWilliams" that provides cultural support for
market transparency where regulations cannot reach. Put differently,
"Model Rule 1.2(d) can be viewed as a public interest obligation of lawyers
to act to protect society by refusing to assist, and thereby discouraging, their
clients' misconduct."" In doing so, the Rule provides an "important line
beyond which lawyers may not go [when] providing representation to their
clients."" Rule 1.2(d) works in concert with Rule 1.13 because the lawyer
must take reasonable remedial action in the face of client misconduct, the
outer limit being withdrawing from representation should the misconduct
constitute criminal or fraudulent behavior.98
In summary, the Model Rules require actual knowledge of a violation
of the securities laws in order for the corporate lawyer to disclose the
violation outside of the corporation. In a cultural setting where aggressive
corporate management has caused its lawyers to adapt to and essentially
become a part of the corporate client's culture," it is not difficult to see the
shortcomings of this approach. For a lawyer who feels that his duty is owed
primarily to the profit-maximization goals of the firm, and, by extension,
to the profit-maximization goals of the firm's clients, the Model Rules do
not incentivize the lawyer to perform his gatekeeping function effectively.
Further, the standard has been characterized as permissively allowing the
corporate lawyer to turn a blind eye to alleged wrongdoing, even when the
circumstances call out for further investigation.100 In a post-Enron world,
the approach taken under the Model Rules with respect to the corporate
gatekeeper profession is inadequate to ensure investor confidence and good
behavior on the part of managers in the securities markets. The "actual
knowledge" trigger under Model Rule 1.13(b) has been roundly criticized
and enabled behavior that served as the impetus for congressional reform
under Sarbanes-Oxley.10
III. SARBANES-OXLEY AND SEC REGULATION: STEPS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
In contrast to the drafters of the Model Rules, the SEC has explicitly
stated its desires to aggressively target corporate transactional lawyers in
the post-Enron world.' Stephen Cutler, former director of the SEC's
Division of Enforcement, explained:
95 McWilliams,supra note 4, at 259-6o.
96 Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 26, at 28.
97 Id. at 29.
98 Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. I.2(d) (2009), with MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. I.13 (2009).
99 See supra Part I.
ioo Cramton et al., supra note 26,at 755-56.
io1 Id. at 755-56; see also Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 26, at 51-57.
102 See Lewis D. Lowenfels et al., Attorneys as Gatekeepers: SEC Actions Against Lawyers in
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Consistent with Sarbanes-Oxley's focus on the important role of lawyers
as gatekeepers, we have stepped up our scrutiny of the role of lawyers in the
corporate frauds we investigate....
A substantial number of SEC enforcement actions in recent years against
counsel to public companies (both internal and external) have highlighted
the SEC's resolve to hold lawyers liable for not performing adequately their
SEC-conceived role as "gatekeepers" to prevent fraud and other securities
law violations. 0
Mr. Cutler also presented the SEC's rationale: the "themes" of these
actions are "the fundamental significance of gatekeepers in maintaining
fair and honest markets; . . . the importance of maintaining integrity in
the investigative process aimed at ferreting out securities law violations;
and . . . the need for greater personal accountability and deterrence at the
top of the corporate world."'" SEC officials have gone so far as to cite
"extraordinary circumstances" that might require gatekeepers "to report
material violations of the law by public issuers [to the SEC]." 0 It is clear
that corporate attorneys are a primary object of the SEC's attention when it
comes to preventing fraud. What remains less clear is the extent to which
the Commission will act pursuant to its mandate under Sarbanes-Oxley to
disrupt fraudulent behavior while respecting the possible "chilling effect"
of "wanting to hold lawyers to an appropriate standard in terms of their
roles as gatekeepers."106
A. The Complex Web of Sarbanes-Oxley Regulation
While the rules promulgated under section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley seem
like simple statements of law, buried within those clauses are "numerous
complex definitional and interpretive issues."' In order to understand the
practical meanings of the new regime, the phrases "appearing and practicing
before the Commission," "in the representation of an issuer," "evidence of
a material violation," and "material violation," must be expounded upon.'0
"Appearing and practicing before the Commission" is defined as:
(i) Transacting any business with the Commission ... (ii) Representing the
issuer in a Commission. .. proceeding ... or investigation ... (iii) Providing
theAge ofSarbanes-Oxley, 37 U. ToL. L. REV. 877, 877 (2oo6).
103 Id. at 877-78 (citations omitted).
104 Cutler,supra note 21.
105 Lowenfels et al., supra note 102, at 882 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Michael Bologna, SEC Enforcement: Officials Cite 'Gatekeeper' Duties of Lawyers for Public Corpo-
rations, 37 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 728, 728 (Apr. 25, 2005)).
io6 Michael Bologna, supra note 105, at 728.
107 Isenberg & Donnelly, supra note 26, at 99.
io8 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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advice in respect of United States securities laws ... regarding any document
that the attorney has notice will be filed with .. . the Commission or (iv)
Advising an issuer as to whether information ... is required . . . to be filed
with ... the Commission.'"
A lawyer taking action "in the representation of an issuer," means
"'providing legal services as an attorney for an issuer, regardless of whether
the attorney is employed or retained by the issuer."' 0 A lawyer is defined
to have encountered "evidence of a material violation" when she finds
"'credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable, under
the circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude
that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing
or is about to occur."'" Finally, "[a] 'material violation' is defined as 'a
material violation of an applicable United States federal or state securities
law . . . or a similar material violation of any United States federal or state
law.""" The plain language of the statute reflects congressional intent that
the SEC should have broad regulatory power in the post-Enron era; and
the SEC has readily accepted Congress's mandate."3
In contrast to the Model Rules, section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley instituted
an objective culpability predicate that resembles simple negligence.
Observers rightly point to Sarbanes-Oxley as an expression of Congress's
desire for the SEC to "change this corporate legal culture and practice
and encourage more reporting of dubious corporate activities."" 4 Senator
Leahy stated the following when introducing a bill predating Sarbanes-
Oxley on the floor of the Senate:
This bill can only be part of the needed response to the problems
exposed by the Enron debacle. It is clear that changes are needed to restore
accountability in our markets. . . . Instead of acting as gatekeepers who
detect and deter fraud, it appears that Enron's ... lawyers brought all their
skills and knowledge to bear in assisting the fraud to succeed and then in
covering it up. We need to reconsider the incentive system that has been
set up that encourages . .. lawyers who come across fraud in their work to
remain silent."s
The SEC responded to Sarbanes-Oxley with regulations requiring a
transactional lawyer, in his role as gatekeeper, to take remedial measures if
he finds "credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable,
under the circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not to
io9 Id. (quoting 17 C.ER. § 205.2(a) (2oo3)).
iio Id. (quoting 17 C.ER. § 205.2(g) (2003)).
iii Id. (quoting, 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (2003)).
1I2 Id. (quoting 17 C.ER. § 205.2(i) (2003)).
113 See Cutler, supra note 21.
114 Cramton et al., supra note 26, at 752.
115 148 CONG. REC. Si 788 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has occurred, is
occurring, or is about to occur."' 16 Through all the verbosity of that sentence
one finds what is essentially a "reasonable person under the circumstances"
standard-simple negligence.
B. Isselmann and In re Google: A Lower Threshold in the Post-Enron World
Despite the relatively clear negligence standard set out by Congress in
Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC's subsequent interpretation of that mandate,
the vast majority of SEC enforcement actions have consisted of cease-and-
desist proceedings directly implicating the gatekeeper attorney in financial
or accounting fraud because of her failure to provide material information
or for intentionally providing false information to a company's independent
auditors."' Those actions cast little light on what is expected of corporate
lawyers pursuant to the new negligence culpability predicate. Notable
exceptions include SECv. Isselmann"I and In re Google."'
In SEC v. Isselmann, the SEC alleged that Isselman, inside general
counsel to ESI, an electronics company, failed "to fulfill his gatekeeper
role [and] was a cause of [the company] reporting materially false financial
results to the public [in violation of] the Commission's rule barring officers
and directors of public companies from omitting to state ... a material fact
to their accountants."" 0 The charge was based on a scenario in which, as
ESI neared the end of a quarterly reporting period, the company's chief
financial officer ("CFO") and controller sought to fraudulently inflate its
financial results by eliminating vested retirement benefits for its employees
in Asia."'
After this accounting maneuver was executed, $1 million was added
to the company's balance sheet."' Isselmann first heard of this decision
during a meeting of the audit committee in which the CFO assured its
members that the move had been reviewed and approved by ESI's legal
counsel in Japan."' Isselmann's only affirmative act during the meeting
I16 Cramton et al., supra note 26, at 752 (quoting 17 C.ER. § 205.2(e) (2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
117 Lowenfels et al., supra note 102, at 879 ("A substantial number of SEC actions
against lawyers post-Sarbanes-Oxley have been cases directly linking the lawyer to financial
or accounting fraud through his or her omitting to furnish material information or providing
false information to a company's independent auditors.").
i18 Isselmann, Litigation Release No. 18896 (Sept. 24, 2004), 2004 WL 213861, available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/ri 8896.htm [hereinafter Isse/mann).
i19 In re Google, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8523 (Jan. 13, 2005), 2005 WL 82435,
available at http://ww-.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8523.htm [hereinafter In re Googlel.
120 Complaint at 1-2, SEC v. Isselmann, No. 04 Civ 1350 (D. Or. Sept. 21, 2004).
121 Id. at 2.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 3-4.
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was to identify ESI's legal counsel in Japan, which caused one member
of the audit committee to believe that Isselmann was verifying that
counsel's opinion.2 4 Soon thereafter, Isselmann consulted with ESI's
counsel in Japan and learned that the benefits for ESI's employees in
Asia could not be unilaterally eliminated."' Isselmann attempted to bring
this issue up during a meeting of ESI's Disclosure Committee, but the
CFO objected and Isselmann remained silent."' After the details of the
accounting transaction and the CFO's full involvement in the fraudulent
scheme became apparent, Isselmann informed the audit committee.'
Isselmann's disclosure led to an internal investigation and a restatement
of ESI's financial results for the quarter.' 8 The SEC instituted a consent
proceeding containing its allegations, and Isselmann settled."'
Under the guidelines found in the Model Rules, the result in Isselmann
is extraordinary. The SEC pursued Isselmann not for affirmative egregious
acts but "rather [for] a failure to act under somewhat difficult and ambiguous
circumstances requiring in essence an interpretation of Japanese law."'
The outcome is at least theoretically consistent, however, with the SEC's
new enforcement regime promulgated under Sarbanes-Oxley. The SEC's
new mandate to enlist a negligence standard in evaluating gatekeeper
conduct allows for a practical lesson to be drawn from Isselmann. That lesson,
of course, explains the type of behavior the SEC views as negligent. The
SEC placed emphasis in its complaint on the fact that Isselmann knew of
the faulty legal advice, attempted to alert the audit committee before being
rebuffed by the CFO, and refrain from acting as ESI's Form 10-Q was filed
with fraudulent financial information."' The issue then is whether it was
reasonable for Isselmann to let the Form 10-Q be filed fraudulently. The
SEC's pursuit of this behavior indicates that a corporate lawyer, faced with
a recalcitrant corporate board, must do more than merely voice objection
to fraudulent filing or else he is not behaving reasonably. It is unclear from
Isselmann's case exactly what constitutes a reasonable course of action.
As in Isselmann, all SEC actions brought under its section 307 authority
have been resolved through consent proceedings and thus have not been
"tested in the full crucible of an adversarial proceeding.""' While these
124 Id. at 4.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 5.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 6.
129 See Lowenfels et al., supra note 102, at 887.
130 Id. at 886 (citation omitted).
131 Complaint, supra note 120, at 5.
132 Lowenfels et al., supra note 102, at 887. The SEC is authorized to issue cease-and-
desist orders and hold cease-and-desist proceedings pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Such proceedings are often terminated through consent proceedings
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cases are ultimately "settled," the simple fact of the charge is enough to
devastate a lawyer's professional reputation and irreparably damage his
career. 3 1 There are serious policy questions that attend such proceedings;
most pertinently, how low should the culpability threshold be before the
state's regulatory mechanism is triggered, severely damaging an attorney's
personal and professional life?
Another example of the SEC acting under Sarbanes-Oxley against a
corporate gatekeeper is In re Google. In In re Google, the SEC brought a
cease-and-desist action against Google and David Drummond, Google's
inside general counsel, for failure to register over $80 million in securities.
Drummond was tasked with generating legal opinions regarding the
applicability of exemptions to cover the entirety of a grant of stock options
to employees."' As Drummond learned more about the nature of the
stock option plan from the corporate managers, he was forced to search
for new and increasingly creative exemptions.'3 6 Although concerned with
the validity of the exemptions as applied to the stock options, Drummond
did not inform the board of directors of his uncertainty when he approved
the plan."' When several exemptions failed and the grant of stock options
was in violation of securities laws, the SEC began the proceeding against
Drummond for failing in his gatekeeper duties.
In re Google is another example of the SEC enlisting what appears to
be a negligence culpability predicate to allege a violation of a transactional
lawyer's gatekeeper duties. Drummond's only culpable act was issuing an
incorrect legal opinion regarding the applicable exemptions for the issue of
employee stock options. A possible corollary violation would be a failure to
monitor Google's corporate managers who continued to issue the options
in excess of the maximum covered by the exemptions."' The complaint is
unclear as to whether Drummond was informed of the excess at the time,
but states that he searched and believed he found other exemptions once
he became aware of the excess. 3 9 Regardless of whether that constituted a
violation of his gatekeeper duties, Drummond was another lawyer snared by
the lower culpability predicate in post-Sarbanes-Oxley SEC enforcement.
Both Isselmann and Drummond would have had strong arguments
against gatekeeper liability had their cases been tried under a state law
where the lawyer and the Commission essentially negotiate a settlement. See id. at 887, 913.
133 Id. (citation omitted).
134 In re Googe, supra note i 19.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 See 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2oo6) (discussing attorney's duty to report material violations of
securities law); 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Zh-I (2010) (listing exemptions from reporting requirements
for managers).
139 In re Googe, supra note i 19.
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that mimics the Model Rules. Each case presents an archetypal situation
Congress and the SEC explicitly wanted to prohibit. In Isselmann's case,
so long as he refrained from informing himself by making phone calls to
Japan, the CFO could have proceeded and Isselmann would have been
shielded from liability due to his lack of knowledge of any violation. As for
Drummond, his creative legal opinions regarding the applicable exemptions
are the sort of grasping at straws that Congress and the SEC aimed to enjoin
by reducing the culpability predicate for gatekeeper liability.
IV A Two-TIERED SYSTEM WOULD MORE PRECISELY CALIBRATE THE
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A. The Current System is Too Broad
The current impasse between aggressive regulation under a negligence
standard, as seen in Isselmann and In re Google,14 and the approach
embraced by the Model Rules that absolves all but the most egregious
violations can be resolved through a two-tiered approach to gatekeeper
liability. The approach to corporate lawyer sanctioning embodied in the
Model Rules does not serve as an effective counterweight to the financial
and reputational incentives that compel modern corporate lawyers to walk
a thin line when it comes to compliance with federal securities laws.141
The increasingly aggressive client-base that these lawyers serve presents
lucrative incentives that the traditional approach does not effectively
restrain. 42 The "actual knowledge" standard does not compel the lawyer to
"tend the gate" at all. Under this standard, the lawyer has the opportunity
to insulate herself from liability by simply walking away from the gate
entirely, abdicating her gatekeeping responsibility, and absolving herself
from any actual knowledge of who and what passed through.
The series of reforms enacted under the auspices of Sarbanes-Oxley
likewise have not provided a satisfactory incentive mechanism; however,
these reforms provide a baseline for improvement.143 In the wake of Enron
and several similar scandals, the approach of the Model Rules clearly
needed to be supplanted by something in order to combat the paucity of
the "actual knowledge" requirement under Model Rule 1.13(b). The
broad scope of enforcement granted to regulators coupled with a simple
negligence standard has given them necessary latitude to explore and
sanction culpable conduct by gatekeeper lawyers. As with many difficult
policy issues, however, the regulatory fix comes with a cost. As attorneys
140 See supra Part III.B.
141 See Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 26, at 14 (arguing that the current rules "are too
lenient in permitting lawyers to assist managerial wrongdoing").
142 See supra Part l.
143 See supra Part III.
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Isselmann and Drummond discovered, in a post-Enron world, grave
consequences might attend arguably non-culpable corporate lawyering.'"
In regulating a highly technical and fast-paced legal field, policymakers
ought to consider whether the benefit afforded by a simple solution is worth
the compliance costs imposed by their regulations. The corporate lawyer's
role as gatekeeper to the securities markets is certainly one that qualifies
for close regulatory scrutiny. Her decisions, after all, have implications that
emanate through, and thus potentially distort, the efficient functioning of
the financial markets. On the other hand, corporate lawyers have a legitimate
interest in being free from unwarranted government interference with the
execution of their professional duties. In considering a regulatory resolution
to serve each competing interest, the current "one size fits all" approach
implemented through SEC consent proceedings warrants examination.
The broad mandate granted to regulators gives them the power to impose
substantial monetary penalties and crippling loss of reputation on attorneys
without having to endure the scrutiny of an adversarial proceeding. 145
An alternative that would serve both the interests of the regulators
in ensuring efficient markets free from manipulation and the interests of
corporate lawyers in exercising their professional responsibilities free from
undue regulatory constraint lies in a more precise calibration of the level of
scrutiny applied to corporate gatekeeper conduct. As currently written, the
SEC regulations do not differentiate between negligent and intentional
misconduct.146 Yet, the announcement of allegations by the SEC, which
is similar for both types of conduct, can subject a corporate lawyer to
significant professional hardship.'4 7 The heart of the matter is that the
enforcement mechanism currently enabling SEC regulators is too blunt
a tool to separate relatively minor infractions from egregious abdications
of professional responsibility. In pursuing a policy that would protect
American financial markets from the blatant frauds committed by the likes
of Enron and its advisors, Congress and the SEC have manufactured a
system that punishes well-meaning corporate lawyers executing aggressive
but plausible managerial decisions similarly to those who willfully defraud
the market community. While there is no counterfactual information
available to support a claim that the current policy has chilled innovative
corporate activity, the respective plights of Isselmann and Drummondl 48
should at least give pause to supporters of the present scheme.
144 See supra Part III.B.
145 See Lowenfels et al., supra note lo2, at 887.
146 See supra Part III.A.
147 See Lowenfels et al., supra note 102, at 887 (Many SEC actions are "terminated
through consents incorporating only the SEC's allegations" because "the lawyer's reputation
and livelihood have already been destroyed by the charges alone.").
148 See supra Part III.
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B. The Two-Tiered Approach
A two-tiered approach that more precisely targets the type of culpable
behavior would be superior to the current enforcement mechanism. Such
a system would differentiate between reckless or intentional misconduct
on the part of corporate gatekeepers and misconduct which is merely
negligent. As it is currently constituted, the enforcement regime consists
largely of cease-and-desist proceedings that are terminated through
consent agreements.149 Because proceedings targeting egregious conduct
garner disproportionate attention but are classified the same as proceedings
premised on less culpable conduct, those lawyers subject to discipline for
minor infractions find themselves disproportionately punished.
To be sure, SEC enforcement efforts serve a vital role in protecting
the integrity of the market system."so Those efforts, however, must be
carefully balanced to avoid upsetting the efficiency of the system they seek
to protect. A more carefully calibrated system that formally recognizes the
distinction between intentionally or recklessly fraudulent behavior on the
one hand, and merely negligent behavior on the other, would better serve
the SEC's mandate and the markets it seeks to protect.
C. The Spiegel Case
The benefits of the proposed framework are aptly demonstrated by
comparing the enforcement actions described above with the SEC's case
against Spiegel, Inc.s' In 2003, the SEC filed a civil complaint against
Spiegel, alleging fraudulent non-disclosure of financial information on
a Form 12b-25 filed with the Commission."s2 The facts of the Spiegel
case present a paradigmatic example of the kind of situation the current
SEC approach was designed to address. In that respect, the Spiegel case
serves as a counterweight to the cases initiated against Isselmann and
Drummond. By focusing specifically on the lawyers and their respective
roles in corporate behavior, the vastly different situation described below
provides compelling support for bifurcating the current SEC enforcement
procedure.
Spiegel, the mail order retailer and former operator of the Eddie
Bauer clothing chain, was a Delaware corporation controlled by German
149 See sources cited supra note 138.
150 See Robert B. Ahdieh, Law's Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law in Market Transition, 77 S.
CAL. L. REV. 215, 272 (2004) ("SEC rules continue to be primarily directed to the protection
of market participants.").
151 SEC v. Spiegel, Inc., No. Civ.A. 03 C 1685, 2003 WL 22176223 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15,
2003).
152 Id. at *27-28.
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businessman Michael Otto, who owned a ninety percent equity stake.'13 In
1999, the corporation instituted an "easy credit" program, extending credit
to unqualified purchasers and selling the receivables to various special
purpose vehicles through an asset backed securitization program.'" When
the economy slowed, many of the credit program's customers defaulted,
causing Spiegel to default on several loan covenants and bringing the
company to the brink of bankruptcy."s Efforts to reorganize the agreements
and improve its general financial situation failed, causing Spiegel's
independent auditors to inform the company that it would issue a "going
concern" opinion, alerting interested parties that the auditors doubted its
ability to continue doing business.1 6
The situation described above summarizes the facts as Spiegel's
outside lawyers, from the firm Kirkland and Ellis, understood them at the
time Spiegel's Form 10-K annual report for the year 2001 came due. Those
lawyers advised Spiegel to file the Form 10-K in late May 2002.'11 Mr. Otto
and the rest of the Spiegel executive and audit boards, however, declined
to file the 10-K, fearing it would alert investors and creditors to the "going
concern" opinion.' Instead, Kirkland and Ellis lawyers filed several Forms
12b-25 in lieu of the Form 10-K and subsequently unfiled Forms 10-Q.111
These records were filed despite the lawyers' full knowledge that they
fraudulently misstated the truth behind the nondisclosures. 6 0 There is no
record of the lawyers from Kirkland and Ellis advising Spiegel of the perils
of its failure to file the forms and thus make non-fraudulent disclosures
to its shareholders. 6 ' Spiegel eventually filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petition. 6 Despite reprimands contained in the Independent Examiner's
Report accompanying the final order,'13 there appears to be no public
record of a settlement between Kirkland and Ellis and the SEC." There
153 See Lowenfels et al., supra note 102, at 892 (citation omitted).
154 Spiegel, Inc., 2003 WL 22176223, at *2.
155 Id. at '2-3.
156 Id. at *3-
157 Id.
158 Id. at *28.
159 Lowenfels et al., supra note 102, at 895.
16o Id.
161 Spiegel, Inc., 2003 WL 22176223, at *45 ("There does not appear to be a record of...
Kirkland [and] Ellis ... advising Spiegel of the dire consequences of its continuing failure to
file its Form io-K and make full disclosure to investors after MaY 31, 2002.").
162 Id. at* 104.
163 Id. at *45-46.
164 Kirkland and Ellis maintains that the Forms 12b-25 that it filed on behalf of Spiegel
were not incorrect. See id. at *27 n.i4. The firm also maintains that Forms 12b-25 are not
themselves disclosure documents, and therefore, no breach of the SEC's disclosure require-
ments occurred. Id. The Independent Examiner's Report, however, states that "[tihere does
not appear to be a record" of Kirkland and Ellis advising Spiegel "of the dire consequences of
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may be a simple explanation for this, however, as the Kirkland and Ellis
lawyers were not subject to the higher standard of Sarbanes-Oxley because
their conduct occurred before its enactment. 165
A comparison of the facts underlying the Spiegel case with those
underlying Isselmann's and Drummond's cases demonstrates the value
of the two-tiered approach: it would permit the SEC to sanction truly
culpable behavior while sparing those lawyers whose negligence does not
warrant severe punishment.
Neither Drummond nor Isselmann acted entirely appropriately. Each
party made missteps, however, they did so in a dynamic environment and,
at worst, with a negligent state of mind. The lawyers in the Spiegel case,
meanwhile, actually knew the filings were fraudulent and went ahead,
facilitating the fraudulent behavior. Although there is no record of sanctions
against the Spiegel lawyers,'" their behavior is more culpable because they
had actual knowledge of the fraud. A two-tiered system would distinguish
these types of situations, giving SEC regulators latitude in the types of
orders it seeks to impose on gatekeeper attorneys, sensitive to the harsh
results of the instigation of any SEC investigation into a corporate lawyer's
practice.
In order to accomplish results consistent with the two-tiered system,
the SEC would need a mechanism whereby it could bifurcate its charging
orders in order to distinguish between different culpability predicates. The
current cease-and-desist order would suffice to continue as the charging
mechanism for reckless or intentional violations. The key innovation of
the two-tiered system would be to invent a new and separate charging
mechanism for those lawyers whose conduct was merely negligent. The
structure and form of the order might be similar to that of the cease-and-
desist order, but the connotations of impropriety would be reduced, thereby
subjecting less culpable lawyers to less onerous treatment. Further, in
order to prevent the machinations of some who might abuse the two-tiered
system by routinely acting negligently, some mechanism could be installed
whereby persistent negligent offenders would graduate to the harsher
treatment of the cease-and-desist order. Of course, there is no silver bullet
to prevent corporate fraud in the realm of securities law. The two-tiered
approach, however, merits consideration for the more precise calibration it
gives to the regulatory efforts of the SEC.
its continuing failure to file its Form lo-K and make full disclosure to investors." Id. at *45. It
goes on to observe that "Kirkland & Ellis .. .could well have caused Spiegel to comply with
its obligations and avoid a fraud charge from the SEC." Id.
165 Id. at *44.
166 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION: THE LOGIC OF THE TWO-TIERED APPROACH
The premise underlying the two-tiered approach is that different
levels of corporate gatekeeper liability ought to be treated differently by
SEC regulators. A two-tiered approach to SEC regulation of the corporate
gatekeeper professions would be vastly superior to the current one-size-
fits-all approach. Under such a system, lawyers who in good faith complied
with their duties, but were simply negligent, would be subject to a different
enforcement process than those who willfully violated securities laws on
behalf of their clients. The current system has the potential to ruin a lawyer's
professional career for a single mistake made in a complex and fast-paced
environment. A two-tiered system would avoid such results. The primary
benefit of a two-tiered system is that it serves each policy that a good SEC
regulation should: it protects passive investors from manipulation of the
securities markets by corporate insiders while protecting those corporate
insiders from obtrusive oversight that would interfere with their primary
duties to maximize shareholder profit. In this way, the transactional attorney
will be in a better position to effectuate what has long been her stated role:
that of the corporate gatekeeper.
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